Showing posts with label afl. Show all posts
Showing posts with label afl. Show all posts

Sunday, June 24, 2018

Compiler fuzzing, part 1

Much has been written about fuzzing compilers already, but there is not a lot that I could find about fuzzing compilers using more modern fuzzing techniques where coverage information is fed back into the fuzzer to find more bugs.

If you know me at all, you know I'll throw anything I can get my hands on at AFL. So I tried gcc. (And clang, and rustc -- but more about Rust in a later post.)

Levels of fuzzing


First let me summarise a post by John Regehr called Levels of Fuzzing, which my approach builds heavily on. Regehr presents a very important idea (which stems from earlier research/papers by others), namely that fuzzing can operate at different "levels". These levels correspond somewhat loosely to the different stages of compilation, i.e. lexing, parsing, type checking, code generation, and optimisation. In terms of fuzzing, the source code that you pass to the compiler has to "pass" one stage before it can enter the next; if you give the compiler a completely random binary file, it is unlikely to even get past the lexing stage, never mind to the point where the compiler is actually generating code. So it is in our interest (assuming we want to fuzz more than just the lexer) to generate test cases more intelligently than just using random binary data.

If we simply try to compile random data, we're not going to get very far.
 
In a "naïve" approach, we simply compile gcc with AFL instrumentation and run afl-fuzz on it as usual. If we give a reasonable corpus of existing C code, it is possible that the fuzzer will find something interesting by randomly mutating the test cases. But more likely than not, it is mostly going to end up with random garbage like what we see above, and never actually progress to more interesting stages of compilation. I did try this -- and the results were as expected. It takes a long time before the fuzzer hits anything interesting at all. Now, Sami Liedes did this with clang back in 2014 and obtained some impressive results ("34 distinct assertion failures in the first 11 hours"). So clearly it was possible to find bugs in this way. When I tried this myself for GCC, I did not find a single crash within a day or so of fuzzing. And looking at the queue of distinct testcases it had found, it was very clear that it was merely scratching the very outermost surface of the input handling in the compiler -- it was not able to produce a single program that would make it past the parsing stage.

AFL has a few built-in mutation strategies: bit flips, "byte flips", arithmetic on bytes, 2-bytes, and 4-bytes, insertion of common boundary values (like 0, 1, powers of 2, -1, etc.), insertions of and substitution by "dictionary strings" (basically user-provided lists of strings), along with random splicing of test cases. We can already sort of guess that most of these strategies will not be useful for C and C++ source code. Perhaps the "dictionary strings" is the most promising for source code as it allows you to insert keywords and snippets of code that have at least some chance of ending up as a valid program. For the other strategies, single bit flips can change variable names, but changing variable names is not that interesting unless you change one variable into another (which both have to exist, as otherwise you would hit a trivial "undeclared" error). They can also create expressions, but if you somehow managed to change a 'h' into a '(', source code with this mutation would always fail unless you also inserted a ')' somewhere else to balance the expression. Source code has a lot of these "correspondances" where changing one thing also requires changing another thing somewhere else in the program if you want it to still compile (even though you don't generate an equivalent program -- that's not what we're trying to do here). Variable uses match up with variable declarations. Parantheses, braces, and brackets must all match up (and in the right order too!).

These "correspondences" remind me a lot of CRCs and checksums in other file formats, and they give the fuzzer problems for the exact same reason: without extra code it's hard to overcome having to change the test case simultaneously in two or more places, never mind making the exact change that will preserve the relationship between these two values. It's a game of combinatorics; the more things we have to change at once and the more possibilities we have for those changes, the harder it will be to get that exact combination when you're working completely at random. For checksums the answer is easy, and there are two very good strategies: either you disable the checksum verification in the code you're fuzzing, or you write a small wrapper to "fix up" your test case so that the checksum always matches the data it protects (of course, after mutating an input you may not really know where in the file the checksum will be located anymore, but that's a different problem).

For C and C++ source code it's not so obvious how to help the fuzzer overcome this. You can of course generate programs with a grammar (and some heuristics), which is what several C random code generators such as Csmith, ccg, and yarpgen do. This is in a sense on the completely opposite side of the spectrum when it comes to the levels of fuzzing. By generating programs that you know are completely valid (and correct, and free of undefined behaviour), you will breeze through the lexing, the parsing, and the type checking and target the code generation and optimization stages. This is what Regehr et al. did in "Taming compiler fuzzers", another very interesting read. (Their approach does not include instrumentation feedback, however, so it is more of a traditional black-box fuzzing approach than AFL, which is considered grey-box fuzzing.)

But if you use a C++ grammar to generate C++ programs, that will also exclude a lot of inputs that are not valid but nevertheless accepted by the compiler. This approach relies on our ability to express all programs that should be valid, but there may also be programs non-valid programs that crash the compiler. As an example, if our generator knows that you cannot add an integer to a function, or assign a value to a constant, then the code paths checking for those conditions in the compiler would never be exercised, despite the fact that those errors are more interesting than mere syntax errors. In other words, there is a whole range of "interesting" test cases which we will never be able to generate if we restrict ourselves only to those programs that are actually valid code.

Please note that I am not saying that one approach is better than the other! I believe we need all of them to successfully find bugs in all the areas of the compiler. By realising exactly what the limits of each method are, we can try to find other ways to fill the gaps.

Fuzzing with a loose grammar


So how can we fill the gap between the shallow syntax errors in the front end and the very deep of the code generation in the back end? There are several things we can do.

The main feature of my solution is to use a "loose" grammar. As opposed to a "strict" grammar which would follow the C/C++ specs to the dot, the loose grammar only really has one type of symbol, and all the production rules in the grammar create this type of symbol. As a simple example, a traditional C grammar will not allow you to put a statement where an expression is expected, whereas the loose grammar has no restrictions on that. It does, however, take care that your parantheses and braces match up. My grammar file therefore looks something like this (also see the full grammar if you're curious!):
"[void] [f] []([]) { [] }"
"[]; []"
"{ [] }"
"[0] + [0]"
...
Here, anything between "[" and "]" (call it a placeholder) can be substituted by any other line from the grammar file. An evolution of a program could therefore plausibly look like this:
void f () { }           // using the "[void] [f] []([]) { [] }" rule
void f () { ; }         // using the "[]; []" rule
void f () { 0 + 0; }    // using the "[0] + [0]" rule
void f ({ }) { 0 + 0; } // using the "{ [] }" rule
...
Wait, what happened at the end there? That's not valid C. No -- but it could still be an interesting thing to try to pass to the compiler. We did have a placeholder where the arguments usually go, and according to the grammar we can put any of the other rules in there. This does quickly generate a lot of nonsensical programs that stop the compiler completely dead in its track at the parsing stage. We do have another trick to help things along, though...

AFL doesn't care at all whether what we pass it is accepted by the compiler or not; it doesn't distinguish between success and failure, only between graceful termination and crashes. However, all we have to do is teach the fuzzer about the difference between exit codes 0 and 1; a 0 means the program passed all of gcc's checks and actually resulted in an object file. Then we can discard all the test cases that result in an error, and keep a corpus of test cases which compile successfully. It's really a no-brainer, but makes such a big difference in what the fuzzer can generate/find.

Enter prog-fuzz


prog-fuzz output


If it's not clear by now, I'm not using afl-fuzz to drive the main fuzzing process for the techniques above. I decided it was easier to write a fuzzer from scratch, just reusing the AFL instrumentation and some of the setup code to collect the coverage information. Without the fork server, it's surprisingly little code, on the order of 15-20 lines of code! (I do have support for the fork server on a different branch and it's not THAT much harder to implement, but I simply haven't gotten around to it yet; and it also wasn't really needed to find a lot of bugs).

You can find prog-fuzz on GitHub: https://github.com/vegard/prog-fuzz

The code is not particularly clean, it's a hacked-up fuzzer that gets the job done. I'll want to clean that up at some point, document all the steps to build gcc with AFL instrumentation, etc., and merge a proper fork server. I just want the code to be out there in case somebody else wants to have a poke around.

Results


From the end of February until some time in April I ran the fuzzer on and off and reported just over 100 distinct gcc bugs in total (32 of them fixed so far, by my count):
Now, there are a few things to be said about these bugs.

First, these bugs are mostly crashes: internal compiler errors ("ICEs"), assertion failures, and segfaults. Compiler crashes are usually not very high priority bugs -- especially when you are dealing with invalid programs. Most of the crashes would never occur "naturally" (i.e. as the result of a programmer trying to write some program). They represent very specific edge cases that may not be important at all in normal usage. So I am under no delusions about the relative importance of these bugs; a compiler crash is hardly a security risk.

However, I still think there is value in fuzzing compilers. Personally I find it very interesting that the same technique on rustc, the Rust compiler, only found 8 bugs in a couple of weeks of fuzzing, and not a single one of them was an actual segfault. I think it does say something about the nature of the code base, code quality, and the relative dangers of different programming languages, in case it was not clear already. In addition, compilers (and compiler writers) should have these fuzz testing techniques available to them, because it clearly finds bugs. Some of these bugs also point to underlying weaknesses or to general cases where something really could go wrong in a real program. In all, knowing about the bugs, even if they are relatively unimportant, will not hurt us.

Second, I should also note that I did have conversations with the gcc devs while fuzzing. I asked if I should open new bugs or attach more test cases to existing reports if I thought the area of the crash looked similar, even if it wasn't the exact same stack trace, etc., and they always told me to file a new report. In fact, I would like to praise the gcc developer community: I have never had such a pleasant bug-reporting experience. Within a day of reporting a new bug, somebody (usually Martin Liška or Marek Polacek) would run the test case and mark the bug as confirmed as well as bisect it using their huge library of precompiled gcc binaries to find the exact revision where the bug was introduced. This is something that I think all projects should strive to do -- the small feedback of having somebody acknowledge the bug is a huge encouragement to continue the process. Other gcc developers were also very active on IRC and answered almost all my questions, ranging from silly "Is this undefined behaviour?" to "Is this worth reporting?". In summary, I have nothing but praise for the gcc community.

I should also add that I played briefly with LLVM/clang, and prog-fuzz found 9 new bugs (2 of them fixed so far):
In addition to those, I also found a few other bugs that had already been reported by Sami Liedes back in 2014 which remain unfixed.

For rustc, I will write a more detailed blog post about how to set it up, as compiling rustc itself with AFL instrumentation is non-trivial and it makes more sense to detail those exact steps apart from this post.

What next?


I mentioned the efforts by Regehr et al. and Dmitry Babokin et al. on Csmith and yarpgen, respectively, as fuzzers that generate valid (UB-free) C/C++ programs for finding code generation bugs. I think there is work to be done here to find more code generation bugs; as far as I can tell, nobody has yet combined instrumentation feedback (grey-box fuzzing) with this kind of test case generator. Well, I tried to do it, but it requires a lot of effort to generate valid programs that are also interesting, and I stopped before finding any actual bugs. But I really think this is the future of compiler fuzzing, and I will outline the ideas that I think will have to go into it:
  • iterative program generation with instrumentation feedback: As opposed to generating one huge program and hoping that it will tickle some interesting path in the compiler you start with a valid program and you apply transformation rules that will gradually introduce complexity in the program. This allows you to use instrumentation feedback to tell exactly which transformations are valuable in terms of new code paths taken, and will give you a corpus of interesting test cases as well as speeding up the full generate/compile/test cycle.
  • have the program perform a calculation with a known result: Instead of compiling the same program with two different compilers or configurations and checking that the resulting binary outputs the same thing (which is what Regehr et al. did in "Taming compiler fuzzers"), we can test one compiler/configuration at a time and simply check that the output matches the known solution.
I don't have the time to continue working on this at the moment, but please do let me know if you would like to give it a try and I'll do my best to answer any questions about the code or the approach.

Acknowledgements


Thanks to John Regehr, Martin Liška, Marek Polacek, Jakub Jelinek, Richard Guenther, David Malcolm, Segher Boessenkool, and Martin Jambor for responding to my questions and bug reports!

Thanks to my employer, Oracle, for allowing me to do part of this fuzzing effort using company time and resources.

Friday, March 17, 2017

Fuzzing the OpenSSH daemon using AFL

(EDIT 2017-03-25: All my patches to make OpenSSH more amenable to fuzzing with AFL are available at https://github.com/vegard/openssh-portable. This also includes improvements to the patches found in this post.)

American Fuzzy Lop is a great tool. It does take a little bit of extra setup and tweaking if you want to go into advanced usage, but mostly it just works out of the box.

In this post, I’ll detail some of the steps you need to get started with fuzzing the OpenSSH daemon (sshd) and show you some tricks that will help get results more quickly.

The AFL home page already displays 4 OpenSSH bugs in its trophy case; these were found by Hanno Böck who used an approach similar to that outlined by Jonathan Foote on how to fuzz servers with AFL.

I take a slightly different approach, which I think is simpler: instead of intercepting system calls to fake network activity, we just run the daemon in “inetd mode”. The inet daemon is not used very much anymore on modern Linux distributions, but the short story is that it sets up the listening network socket for you and launches a new process to handle each new incoming connection. inetd then passes the network socket to the target program as stdin/stdout. Thus, when sshd is started in inet mode, it communicates with a single client over stdin/stdout, which is exactly what we need for AFL.

Configuring and building AFL

If you are just starting out with AFL, you can probably just type make in the top-level AFL directory to compile everything, and it will just work. However, I want to use some more advanced features, in particular I would like to compile sshd using LLVM-based instrumentation (which is slightly faster than the “assembly transformation by sed” that AFL uses by default). Using LLVM also allows us to move the target program’s “fork point” from just before entering main() to an arbitrary location (known as “deferred forkserver mode” in AFL-speak); this means that we can skip some of the setup operations in OpenSSH, most notably reading/parsing configs and loading private keys.

Most of the steps for using LLVM mode are detailed in AFL’s llvm_mode/README.llvm. On Ubuntu, you should install the clang and llvm packages, then run make -C llvm_mode from the top-level AFL directory, and that’s pretty much it. You should get a binary called afl-clang-fast, which is what we’re going to use to compile sshd.

Configuring and building OpenSSH

I’m on Linux so I use the “portable” flavour of OpenSSH, which conveniently also uses git (as opposed to the OpenBSD version which still uses CVS – WTF!?). Go ahead and clone it from git://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git.

Run autoreconf to generate the configure script. This is how I run the config script:

./configure \
    CC="$PWD/afl-2.39b/afl-clang-fast" \
    CFLAGS="-g -O3" \
    --prefix=$PWD/install \
    --with-privsep-path=$PWD/var-empty \
    --with-sandbox=no \
    --with-privsep-user=vegard

You obviously need to pass the right path to afl-clang-fast. I’ve also created two directories in the current (top-level OpenSSH directory), install and var-empty. This is so that we can run make install without being root (although var-empty needs to have mode 700 and be owned by root) and without risking clobbering any system files (which would be extremely bad, as we’re later going to disable authentication and encryption!). We really do need to run make install, even though we’re not going to be running sshd from the installation directory. This is because sshd needs some private keys to run, and that is where it will look for them.

(EDIT 2017-03-25: Passing --without-pie to configure may help make the resulting binaries easier to debug since instruction pointers will not be randomised.)

If everything goes well, running make should display the AFL banner as OpenSSH is compiled.

You may need some extra libraries (zlib1g-dev and libssl-dev on Ubuntu) for the build to succeeed.

Run make install to install sshd into the install/ subdirectory (and again, please don’t run this as root).

We will have to rebuild OpenSSH a few times as we apply some patches to it, but this gives you the basic ingredients for a build. One particular annoying thing I’ve noticed is that OpenSSH doesn’t always detect source changes when you run make (and so your changes may not actually make it into the binary). For this reason I just adopted the habit of always running make clean before recompiling anything. Just a heads up!

Running sshd

Before we can actually run sshd under AFL, we need to figure out exactly how to invoke it with all the right flags and options. This is what I use:

./sshd -d -e -p 2200 -r -f sshd_config -i

This is what it means:

-d
“Debug mode”. Keeps the daemon from forking, makes it accept only a single connection, and keeps it from putting itself in the background. All useful things that we need.
-e
This makes it log to stderr instead of syslog; this first of all prevents clobbering your system log with debug messages from our fuzzing instance, and also gives a small speed boost.
-p 2200
The TCP port to listen to. This is not really used in inetd mode (-i), but is useful later on when we want to generate our first input testcase.
-r
This option is not documented (or not in my man page, at least), but you can find it in the source code, which should hopefully also explain what it does: preventing sshd from re-execing itself. I think this is a security feature, since it allows the process to isolate itself from the original environment. In our case, it complicates and slows things down unnecessarily, so we disable it by passing -r.
-f sshd_config
Use the sshd_config from the current directory. This just allows us to customise the config later without having to reinstall it or be unsure about which location it’s really loaded from.
-i
“Inetd mode”. As already mentioned, inetd mode will make the server process a single connection on stdin/stdout, which is a perfect fit for AFL (as it will write testcases on the program’s stdin by default).

Go ahead and run it. It should hopefully print something like this:

$ ./sshd -d -e -p 2200 -r -f sshd_config -i
debug1: sshd version OpenSSH_7.4, OpenSSL 1.0.2g  1 Mar 2016
debug1: private host key #0: ssh-rsa SHA256:f9xyp3dC+9jCajEBOdhjVRAhxp4RU0amQoj0QJAI9J0
debug1: private host key #1: ssh-dss SHA256:sGRlJclqfI2z63JzwjNlHtCmT4D1WkfPmW3Zdof7SGw
debug1: private host key #2: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 SHA256:02NDjij34MUhDnifUDVESUdJ14jbzkusoerBq1ghS0s
debug1: private host key #3: ssh-ed25519 SHA256:RsHu96ANXZ+Rk3KL8VUu1DBzxwfZAPF9AxhVANkekNE
debug1: setgroups() failed: Operation not permitted
debug1: inetd sockets after dupping: 3, 4
Connection from UNKNOWN port 65535 on UNKNOWN port 65535
SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.4

If you type some garbage and press enter, it will probably give you “Protocol mismatch.” and exit. This is good!

Detecting crashes/disabling privilege separation mode

One of the first obstacles I ran into was the fact that I saw sshd crashing in my system logs, but AFL wasn’t detecting them as crashes:

[726976.333225] sshd[29691]: segfault at 0 ip 000055d3f3139890 sp 00007fff21faa268 error 4 in sshd[55d3f30ca000+bf000]
[726984.822798] sshd[29702]: segfault at 4 ip 00007f503b4f3435 sp 00007fff84c05248 error 4 in libc-2.23.so[7f503b3a6000+1bf000]

The problem is that OpenSSH comes with a “privilege separation mode” that forks a child process and runs most of the code inside the child. If the child segfaults, the parent still exits normally, so it masks the segfault from AFL (which only observes the parent process directly).

In version 7.4 and earlier, privilege separation mode can easily be disabled by adding “UsePrivilegeSeparation no” to sshd_config or passing -o UsePrivilegeSeaparation=no on the command line.

Unfortunately it looks like the OpenSSH developers are removing the ability to disable privilege separation mode in version 7.5 and onwards. This is not a big deal, as OpenSSH maintainer Damien Miller writes on Twitter: “the infrastructure will be there for a while and it’s a 1-line change to turn privsep off”. So you may have to dive into sshd.c to disable it in the future.

(EDIT 2017-03-25: I’ve pushed the source tweak for disabling privilege separation for 7.5 and newer to my OpenSSH GitHub repo. This also obsoletes the need for a config change.)

Reducing randomness

OpenSSH uses random nonces during the handshake to prevent “replay attacks” where you would record somebody’s (encrypted) SSH session and then you feed the same data to the server again to authenticate again. When random numbers are used, the server and the client will calculate a new set of keys and thus thwart the replay attack.

In our case, we explicitly want to be able to replay traffic and obtain the same result two times in a row; otherwise, the fuzzer would not be able to gain any useful data from a single connection attempt (as the testcase it found would not be usable for further fuzzing).

There’s also the possibility that randomness introduces variabilities in other code paths not related to the handshake, but I don’t really know. In any case, we can easily disable the random number generator. On my system, with the configure line above, all or most random numbers seem to come from arc4random_buf() in openbsd-compat/arc4random.c, so to make random numbers very predictable, we can apply this patch:

diff --git openbsd-compat/arc4random.c openbsd-compat/arc4random.c
--- openbsd-compat/arc4random.c
+++ openbsd-compat/arc4random.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ void
 arc4random_buf(void *buf, size_t n)
 {
        _ARC4_LOCK();
-       _rs_random_buf(buf, n);
+       memset(buf, 0, n);
        _ARC4_UNLOCK();
 }
 # endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF */

One way to test whether this patch is effective is to try to packet-capture an SSH session and see if it can be replayed successfully. We’re going to have to do that later anyway in order to create our first input testcase, so skip below if you want to see how that’s done. In any case, AFL would also tell us using its “stability” indicator if something was really off with regards to random numbers (>95% stability is generally good, <90% would indicate that something is off and needs to be fixed).

Increasing coverage

Disabling message CRCs

When fuzzing, we really want to disable as many checksums as we can, as Damien Miller also wrote on twitter: “fuzzing usually wants other code changes too, like ignoring MAC/signature failures to make more stuff reachable”. This may sound a little strange at first, but makes perfect sense: In a real attack scenario, we can always1 fix up CRCs and other checksums to match what the program expects.

If we don’t disable checksums (and we don’t try to fix them up), then the fuzzer will make very little progress. A single bit flip in a checksum-protected area will just fail the checksum test and never allow the fuzzer to proceed.

We could of course also fix the checksum up before passing the data to the SSH server, but this is slow and complicated. It’s better to disable the checksum test in the server and then try to fix it up if we do happen to find a testcase which can crash the modified server.

The first thing we can disable is the packet CRC test:

diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -1635,7 +1635,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll1(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep)
 
        cp = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet) + len - 4;
        stored_checksum = PEEK_U32(cp);
-       if (checksum != stored_checksum) {
+       if (0 && checksum != stored_checksum) {
                error("Corrupted check bytes on input");
                if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "connection corrupted")) != 0 ||
                    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)

As far as I understand, this is a simple (non-cryptographic) integrity check meant just as a sanity check against bit flips or incorrectly encoded data.

Disabling MACs

We can also disable Message Authentication Codes (MACs), which are the cryptographic equivalent of checksums, but which also guarantees that the message came from the expected sender:

diff --git mac.c mac.c
index 5ba7fae1..ced66fe6 100644
--- mac.c
+++ mac.c
@@ -229,8 +229,10 @@ mac_check(struct sshmac *mac, u_int32_t seqno,
        if ((r = mac_compute(mac, seqno, data, dlen,
            ourmac, sizeof(ourmac))) != 0)
                return r;
+#if 0
        if (timingsafe_bcmp(ourmac, theirmac, mac->mac_len) != 0)
                return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
+#endif
        return 0;
 }
 

We do have to be very careful when making these changes. We want to try to preserve the original behaviour of the program as much as we can, in the sense that we have to be very careful not to introduce bugs of our own. For example, we have to be very sure that we don’t accidentally skip the test which checks that the packet is large enough to contain a checksum in the first place. If we had accidentally skipped that, it is possible that the program being fuzzed would try to access memory beyond the end of the buffer, which would be a bug which is not present in the original program.

This is also a good reason to never submit crashing testcases to the developers of a program unless you can show that they also crash a completely unmodified program.

Disabling encryption

The last thing we can do, unless you wish to only fuzz the unencrypted initial protocol handshake and key exchange, is to disable encryption altogether.

The reason for doing this is exactly the same as the reason for disabling checksums and MACs, namely that the fuzzer would have no hope of being able to fuzz the protocol itself if it had to work with the encrypted data (since touching the encrypted data with overwhelming probability will just cause it to decrypt to random and utter garbage).

Making the change is surprisingly simple, as OpenSSH already comes with a psuedo-cipher that just passes data through without actually encrypting/decrypting it. All we have to do is to make it available as a cipher that can be negotiated between the client and the server. We can use this patch:

diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c
index 2def333..64cdadf 100644
--- a/cipher.c
+++ b/cipher.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_BF */
 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-       { "none",       SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
+       { "none",       SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
        { "3des-cbc",   SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF
        { "blowfish-cbc",

To use this cipher by default, just put “Ciphers none” in your sshd_config. Of course, the client doesn’t support it out of the box either, so if you make any test connections, you have to have to use the ssh binary compiled with the patched cipher.c above as well.

You may have to pass pass -o Ciphers=none from the client as well if it prefers to use a different cipher by default. Use strace or wireshark to verify that communication beyond the initial protocol setup happens in plaintext.

Making it fast

afl-clang-fast/LLVM “deferred forkserver mode”

I mentioned above that using afl-clang-fast (i.e. AFL’s LLVM deferred forkserver mode) allows us to move the “fork point” to skip some of the sshd initialisation steps which are the same for every single testcase we can throw at it.

To make a long story short, we need to put a call to __AFL_INIT() at the right spot in the program, separating the stuff that doesn’t depend on a specific input to happen before it and the testcase-specific handling to happen after it. I’ve used this patch:

diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1840,6 +1840,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
        /* ignore SIGPIPE */
        signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
 
+       __AFL_INIT();
+
        /* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */
        if (inetd_flag) {
                server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out);

AFL should be able to automatically detect that you no longer wish to start the program from the top of main() every time. However, with only the patch above, I got this scary-looking error message:

Hmm, looks like the target binary terminated before we could complete a
handshake with the injected code. Perhaps there is a horrible bug in the
fuzzer. Poke <lcamtuf@coredump.cx> for troubleshooting tips.

So there is obviously some AFL magic code here to make the fuzzer and the fuzzed program communicate. After poking around in afl-fuzz.c, I found FORKSRV_FD, which is a file descriptor pointing to a pipe used for this purpose. The value is 198 (and the other end of the pipe is 199).

To try to figure out what was going wrong, I ran afl-fuzz under strace, and it showed that file descriptors 198 and 199 were getting closed by sshd. With some more digging, I found the call to closefrom(), which is a function that closes all inherited (and presumed unused) file descriptors starting at a given number. Again, the reason for this code to exist in the first place is probably in order to reduce the attack surface in case an attacker is able to gain control the process. Anyway, the solution is to protect these special file descriptors using a patch like this:

diff --git openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
--- openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+++ openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
        while ((dent = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
            fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
            if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
-               fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
+               fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp) && fd != 198 && fd != 199)
                (void) close((int) fd);
        }
        (void) closedir(dirp);

Skipping expensive DH/curve and key derivation operations

At this point, I still wasn’t happy with the execution speed: Some testcases were as low as 10 execs/second, which is really slow.

I tried compiling sshd with -pg (for gprof) to try to figure out where the time was going, but there are many obstacles to getting this to work properly: First of all, sshd exits using _exit(255) through its cleanup_exit() function. This is not a “normal” exit and so the gmon.out file (containing the profile data) is not written out at all. Applying a source patch to fix that, sshd will give you a “Permission denied” error as it tries to open the file for writing. The problem now is that sshd does a chdir("/"), meaning that it’s trying to write the profile data in a directory where it doesn’t have access. The solution is again simple, just add another chdir() to a writable location before calling exit(). Even with this in place, the profile came out completely empty for me. Maybe it’s another one of those privilege separation things. In any case, I decided to just use valgrind and its “cachegrind” tool to obtain the profile. It’s much easier and gives me the data I need without hassles of reconfiguring, patching, and recompiling.

The profile showed one very specific hot spot, coming from two different locations: elliptic curve point multiplication.

I don’t really know too much about elliptic curve cryptography, but apparently it’s pretty expensive to calculate. However, we don’t really need to deal with it; we can assume that the key exchange between the server and the client succeeds. Similar to how we increased coverage above by skipping message CRC checks and replacing the encryption with a dummy cipher, we can simply skip the expensive operations and assume they always succeed. This is a trade-off; we are no longer fuzzing all the verification steps, but allows the fuzzer to concentrate more on the protocol parsing itself. I applied this patch:

diff --git kexc25519.c kexc25519.c
--- kexc25519.c
+++ kexc25519.c
@@ -68,10 +68,13 @@ kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
 
        /* Check for all-zero public key */
        explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#if 0
        if (timingsafe_bcmp(pub, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE) == 0)
                return SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
 
        crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(shared_key, key, pub);
+#endif
+
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
        dump_digest("shared secret", shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
 #endif
diff --git kexc25519s.c kexc25519s.c
--- kexc25519s.c
+++ kexc25519s.c
@@ -67,7 +67,12 @@ input_kex_c25519_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
        int r;
 
        /* generate private key */
+#if 0
        kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pubkey);
+#else
+       explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
+       explicit_bzero(server_pubkey, sizeof(server_pubkey));
+#endif
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
        dump_digest("server private key:", server_key, sizeof(server_key));
 #endif

With this patch in place, execs/second went to ~2,000 per core, which is a much better speed to be fuzzing at.

(EDIT 2017-03-25: As it turns out, this patch is not very good, because it causes a later key validity check to fail (dh_pub_is_valid() in input_kex_dh_init()). We could perhaps make dh_pub_is_valid() always return true, but then there is a question of whether this in turn makes something else fail down the line.)

Creating the first input testcases

Before we can start fuzzing for real, we have to create the first few input testcases. Actually, a single one is enough to get started, but if you know how to create different ones taking different code paths in the server, that may help jumpstart the fuzzing process. A few possibilities I can think of:

  • ssh -A for ssh agent forwarding
  • ssh -R to enable arbitrary port forwarding
  • ssh -Y to enable X11 forwarding
  • scp to transfer a file
  • password vs. pubkey authentication

The way I created the first testcase was to record the traffic from the client to the server using strace. Start the server without -i:

./sshd -d -e -p 2200 -r -f sshd_config
[...]
Server listening on :: port 2200.

Then start a client (using the ssh binary you’ve just compiled) under strace:

$ strace -e trace=write -o strace.log -f -s 8192 ./ssh -c none -p 2200 localhost

This should hopefully log you in (if not, you may have to fiddle with users, keys, and passwords until you succeed in logging in to the server you just started).

The first few lines of the strace log should read something like this:

2945  write(3, "SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.4\r\n", 21) = 21
2945  write(3, "\0\0\4|\5\24\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0010curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,ext-info-c\0\0\1\"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa\0\0\0\4none\0\0\0\4none\0\0\0\325umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1\0\0\0\325umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1\0\0\0\32none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib\0\0\0\32none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 1152) = 1152

We see here that the client is communicating over file descriptor 3. You will have to delete all the writes happening on other file descriptors. Then take the strings and paste them into a Python script, something like:

import sys
for x in [
    "SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.4\r\n"
    "\0\0\4..."
    ...
]:
    sys.stdout.write(x)

When you run this, it will print a byte-perfect copy of everything that the client sent to stdout. Just redirect this to a file. That file will be your first input testcase.

You can do a test run (without AFL) by passing the same data to the server again (this time using -i):

./sshd -d -e -p 2200 -r -f sshd_config -i < testcase 2>&1 > /dev/null

Hopefully it will show that your testcase replay was able to log in successfully.

Before starting the fuzzer you can also double check that the instrumentation works as expected using afl-analyze:

~/afl-2.39b/afl-analyze -i testcase -- ./sshd -d -e -p 2200 -r -f sshd_config -i

This may take a few seconds to run, but should eventually show you a map of the file and what it thinks each byte means. If there is too much red, that’s an indication you were not able to disable checksumming/encryption properly (maybe you have to make clean and rebuild?). You may also see other errors, including that AFL didn’t detect any instrumentation (did you compile sshd with afl-clang-fast?). This is general AFL troubleshooting territory, so I’d recommend checking out the AFL documentation.

Creating an OpenSSH dictionary

I created an AFL “dictionary” for OpenSSH, which is basically just a list of strings with special meaning to the program being fuzzed. I just used a few of the strings found by running ssh -Q cipher, etc. to allow the fuzzer to use these strings without having to discover them all at once (which is pretty unlikely to happen by chance).

s0="3des-cbc"
s1="aes128-cbc"
s2="aes128-ctr"
s3="aes128-gcm@openssh.com"
s4="aes192-cbc"
s5="aes192-ctr"
s6="aes256-cbc"
s7="aes256-ctr"
s8="aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
s9="arcfour"
s10="arcfour128"
s11="arcfour256"
s12="blowfish-cbc"
s13="cast128-cbc"
s14="chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"
s15="curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"
s16="diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
s17="diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
s18="diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
s19="diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"
s20="ecdh-sha2-nistp256"
s21="ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
s22="ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
s23="ecdsa-sha2-nistp256"
s24="ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
s25="ecdsa-sha2-nistp384"
s26="ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com"
s27="ecdsa-sha2-nistp521"
s28="ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
s29="hmac-md5"
s30="hmac-md5-96"
s31="hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com"
s32="hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com"
s33="hmac-ripemd160"
s34="hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com"
s35="hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com"
s36="hmac-sha1"
s37="hmac-sha1-96"
s38="hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com"
s39="hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com"
s40="hmac-sha2-256"
s41="hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com"
s42="hmac-sha2-512"
s43="hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
s44="rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
s45="ssh-dss"
s46="ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com"
s47="ssh-ed25519"
s48="ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
s49="ssh-rsa"
s50="ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com"
s51="umac-128-etm@openssh.com"
s52="umac-128@openssh.com"
s53="umac-64-etm@openssh.com"
s54="umac-64@openssh.com"

Just save it as openssh.dict; to use it, we will pass the filename to the -x option of afl-fuzz.

Running AFL

Whew, it’s finally time to start the fuzzing!

First, create two directories, input and output. Place your initial testcase in the input directory. Then, for the output directory, we’re going to use a little hack that I’ve found to speed up the fuzzing process and keep AFL from hitting the disk all the time: mount a tmpfs RAM-disk on output with:

sudo mount -t tmpfs none output/

Of course, if you shut down (or crash) your machine without copying the data out of this directory, it will be gone, so you should make a backup of it every once in a while. I personally just use a bash one-liner that just tars it up to the real on-disk filesystem every few hours.

To start a single fuzzer, you can use something like:

~/afl-2.39b/afl-fuzz -x sshd.dict -i input -o output -M 0 -- ./sshd -d -e -p 2100 -r -f sshd_config -i

Again, see the AFL docs on how to do parallel fuzzing. I have a simple bash script that just launches a bunch of the line above (with different values to the -M or -S option) in different screen windows.

Hopefully you should see something like this:

                         american fuzzy lop 2.39b (31)

┌─ process timing ─────────────────────────────────────┬─ overall results ─────┐
│        run time : 0 days, 13 hrs, 22 min, 40 sec     │  cycles done : 152    │
│   last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 14 min, 57 sec      │  total paths : 1577   │
│ last uniq crash : none seen yet                      │ uniq crashes : 0      │
│  last uniq hang : none seen yet                      │   uniq hangs : 0      │
├─ cycle progress ────────────────────┬─ map coverage ─┴───────────────────────┤
│  now processing : 717* (45.47%)     │    map density : 3.98% / 6.67%         │
│ paths timed out : 0 (0.00%)         │ count coverage : 3.80 bits/tuple       │
├─ stage progress ────────────────────┼─ findings in depth ────────────────────┤
│  now trying : splice 4              │ favored paths : 117 (7.42%)            │
│ stage execs : 74/128 (57.81%)       │  new edges on : 178 (11.29%)           │
│ total execs : 74.3M                 │ total crashes : 0 (0 unique)           │
│  exec speed : 1888/sec              │   total hangs : 0 (0 unique)           │
├─ fuzzing strategy yields ───────────┴───────────────┬─ path geometry ────────┤
│   bit flips : n/a, n/a, n/a                         │    levels : 7          │
│  byte flips : n/a, n/a, n/a                         │   pending : 2          │
│ arithmetics : n/a, n/a, n/a                         │  pend fav : 0          │
│  known ints : n/a, n/a, n/a                         │ own finds : 59         │
│  dictionary : n/a, n/a, n/a                         │  imported : 245        │
│       havoc : 39/25.3M, 20/47.2M                    │ stability : 97.55%     │
│        trim : 2.81%/1.84M, n/a                      ├────────────────────────┘
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘          [cpu015: 62%]

Crashes found

In about a day of fuzzing (even before disabling encryption), I found a couple of NULL pointer dereferences during key exchange. Fortunately, these crashes are not harmful in practice because of OpenSSH’s privilege separation code, so at most we’re crashing an unprivileged child process and leaving a scary segfault message in the system log. The fix made it in CVS here: http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/kex.c?rev=1.131&content-type=text/x-cvsweb-markup.

Conclusion

Apart from the two harmless NULL pointer dereferences I found, I haven’t been able to find anything else yet, which seems to indicate that OpenSSH is fairly robust (which is good!).

I hope some of the techniques and patches I used here will help more people get into fuzzing OpenSSH.

Other things to do from here include doing some fuzzing rounds using ASAN or running the corpus through valgrind, although it’s probably easier to do this once you already have a good sized corpus found without them, as both ASAN and valgrind have a performance penalty.

It could also be useful to look into ./configure options to configure the build more like a typical distro build; I haven’t done anything here except to get it to build in a minimal environment.

Please let me know in the comments if you have other ideas on how to expand coverage or make fuzzing OpenSSH faster!

Thanks

I’d like to thank Oracle (my employer) for providing the hardware on which to run lots of AFL instances in parallel :-)


  1. Well, we can’t fix up signatures we don’t have the private key for, so in those cases we’ll just assume the attacker does have the private key. You can still do damage e.g. in an otherwise locked down environment; as an example, GitHub uses the SSH protocol to allow pushing to your repositories. These SSH accounts are heavily locked down, as you can’t run arbitrary commands on them. In this case, however, we do have have the secret key used to authenticate and sign messages.